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Abstract
There is a growing consensus that global temperature and precipitation patterns
will change over the coming century, yet we have scant evidence on how agents will
adapt to these new climate patterns. Existing estimates of climate change adaptation
rely almost exclusively on extrapolation from cross-sectional variation, an approach
that suffers from omitted variable bias and additionally relies on the assumptions of
costless adaptation and of perfect knowledge of climate change. In this paper, I pro-
vide new and more reliable estimates of the ability of farmers to adapt to changes
in their climate, based on evidence from historical variation in the intensity of the
Indian monsoon. The Indian monsoon undergoes zonal and meridional regimes,
in which droughts or floods are more common respectively, and these regimes last
several decades. I find evidence that farmers adjust their irrigation investment and
the water-intensiveness of their crop portfolio depending on which monsoon regime
they currently face. Specifically, for a one standard deviation decrease in lagged
decade mean rainfall, farmers increase their proportion of irrigated land by 1.6 per-
centage points and increase the area planted to drought-tolerant crops by 2.1 percent-
age points. However, the ability of farmers to protect their profits via adaptation is
limited: I find that only 14% of the profits lost due to harmful changes in the climate
are recovered via adaptation.
JEL CODES: O13, Q12, Q54, Q56
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus among climate scientists that global temperature and pre-
cipitation patterns are changing and that these changes will accelerate over the coming
century (Christensen and Hewitson, 2007). However, there is substantial uncertainty
about what the total economic impacts of climate change will be. Estimates of the cost
of a 2.5− 3 ◦C warming scenario range from a 1% gain of global GDP to a 4% loss of GDP.
Regional impacts are even more uncertain, ranging, for example, from 3 to 23% loss of
GDP for Africa, and from a 13% gain to a 9% loss for Asia (Tol 2009).1 A major driver be-
hind the uncertainty of economic impacts is uncertainty about adaptation: to what extent
will agents in the economy be able to detect and respond to changes in the climate? Un-
derstanding the ability of agents to adapt is particularly crucial in developing countries
and in the agricultural sector, as both are especially vulnerable to climate change (Hanson
et al., 2007).
I estimate the extent to which farmers in India have adapted to historical, non-anthropogenic
variations in their climate. The Indian monsoon undergoes phases in which droughts or
floods are more common (known as zonal and meridional regimes, respectively), and
these phases typically last for three to four decades. I test whether farmers in India have
detected these medium-run variations in their climate and whether they have adapted
their farm practices in response to them. I find evidence that farmers have adapted the
water-intensiveness of their crop portfolio as well as their irrigation investment, in re-
sponse to these variations of the monsoon. However, the impact on profits of the adapta-
tion response is small: farmers are only able to recoup 14% of the losses due to harmful
variations in their climate.
This paper is related to two strands of literature: first, the literature that estimates
the economic impacts of climate change, and second, the literature that estimates how
agents will adapt to climate change. Regarding the literature on economic impacts, most
studies rely on one of three methodologies. In the crop modeling approach, researchers use
data from controlled experiments (in, for example, greenhouses), to study the effect of
increased temperatures on crop yields. This approach assumes zero adaptation: it does
not allow for the fact that farmers might alter their crop choice or agricultural inputs in
response to the increased temperatures. In the Ricardian approach, researchers estimate a
cross-sectional correlation between climate and farmland prices and then use this corre-
1Note that these warming scenarios include both the changes in temperature and the associated changes
in precipitation, which are variable across the globe. Furthermore, as Tol acknowledges in his survey paper,
there are no estimates for the total economic cost of a change in climate that exceeds 3 ◦C warming, despite
the fact that much larger increases in temperature are possible.
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lation to derive climate change impacts. The Ricardian approach assumes instantaneous
and costless adaptation: it does not allow for financial or informational barriers to adap-
tion. Lastly, in the panel approach, researchers estimate climate change impacts using year-
to-year variations in the weather. Similarly to the crop modeling approach, the panel
approach assumes zero adaptation. In the context of India, Khan et al. (2009) is an ex-
ample of the crop modeling approach, Sanghi and Mendelsohn (2008) is an example of
the Ricardian approach, and Guiteras (2009) and Burgess et al. (2011) are examples of the
panel approach.
This paper is also related to the literature on adaptation to climate change. The ex-
isting literature on adaptation relies primarily on the Ricardian approach. In this ap-
proach, researchers estimate a cross-sectional relationship between agricultural practices
and climate, and then use this cross-sectional relationship to predict how farmers will
adjust their agricultural practices under anthropogenic climate change. Papers using this
methodology have studied farm type (Seo and Mendelsohn, 2008b), livestock choice (Seo
et al., 2010), crop choice (Seo and Mendelsohn, 2008a) and irrigation (Fishman, 2011; Ku-
rukulasuriya et al., 2011). However, Ricardian estimates of adaptation suffer from several
problems. First, since they rely on cross-sectional variation, these estimates suffer from
a potential omitted variable problem: if unobserved factors, such as soil quality, market
institutions, or infrastructure are correlated with cross-sectional variation in climate, then
estimates will be biased.2 A second issue is that Ricardian estimates are based on how
farmers have adapted to a stationary climate that they (and their ancestors) have faced
for centuries. Hence the estimates may be of limited applicability to the situation of a
climate that is varying over time. In particular, Ricardian estimates can tell us nothing
about the speed of adaptation. Furthermore, the Ricardian approach will give upwardly
biased estimates of adaptation in the (highly likely) case that there are financial and in-
formational barriers to adaptation. For this reason, Ricardian estimates of adaptation are
most appropriate for the very long-run, once a new stable climate has been reached, and
they are less informative for the short-run and medium-run, during which farmers are on
the transition path to a new climate.
The principal contribution of this paper is that I construct estimates of climate change
adaptation that do not rely on cross-sectional climate variation, but instead are based on
how farmers have adapted to actual, historical changes in India’s climate. Figure 1 shows
the 31-year moving average of the all-India summer monsoon rainfall. As can be seen
in the graph, there were two periods where the rainfall for all of India was above its his-
2Since these papers often use data on farmers across several different countries with widely varying
institutions, infrastructure and geography, the magnitude of the omitted variable bias could be severe.
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torical average, roughly from 1870 to 1900 and again during 1930 to 1970, and two com-
plementary periods during which rainfall was below its historical average. The existence
of these rainfall regimes means that for a given farmer, annual rainfall is not i.i.d. Rain-
fall realizations from the last decade or so give the farmer some information about what
the rainfall over the coming decade will be. Importantly for my identification strategy,
there is spatial variation in the timing of these rainfall regimes, as can be seen from Fig-
ure 2, which replicates Figure 1 for the five meteorological regions of India. I test whether
farmers are adapting to the regime-based variation in their climate, by analyzing whether
their agricultural assets and crop portfolios respond to lagged weather. I exploit the fact
that the return to irrigation investment varies across wet versus dry growing seasons and
that similarly, the relative yields of different crops vary across wet versus dry growing
seasons. My empirical strategy is to test whether irrigation assets and crop portfolios re-
spond to lagged weather, while controlling for wealth, household fixed effects and year
fixed effects. The household fixed effects allow me to control for omitted variables such
as soil quality, institutions, infrastructure, and unobserved farmer ability. The year fixed
effects allow me to separate adaptation effects from smooth time trends in irrigation and
crop choice. I am able to include the year fixed effects due to the spatial variation in the
timing of the rainfall regimes.
This paper has two key advantages over the previous literature. First of all, I use panel
data on agricultural households, and hence I eliminate the omitted variable bias that con-
taminates Ricardian estimates of adaptation. Secondly, because I measure adaptation to
a climate that is varying over time, my approach takes into account informational and
financial barriers to adaptation. A related paper that also estimates how economic agents
have responded to time-varying changes in their climate is Hornbeck (2009), which stud-
ies how farmers adapted to the Dust Bowl, a sudden and severe period of drought and
soil erosion that affected the US Midwest in the 1930’s. Hornbeck finds that adaptation
was severely limited and that people primarily adapted by migrating out of the area.
This is an interesting result, however because the Dust Bowl was so sudden and severe,
the results are of limited applicability to anthropogenic climate change, since most places
will experience small changes in their climate. The current paper has the advantage of
measuring adaptation to marginal changes in climate, rather than catastrophic changes.
Furthermore, Hornbeck is not able to explicitly separate farmers expectations of future
climate from their response to (already realized) soil erosion. In contrast, I am able to
explicitly test whether farmers are updating their expectations of future climate, based on
lagged realizations of climate.
I model the Indian monsoon as a hidden Markov model, where the regime type (wet or
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dry) is the unobserved state variable, and growing season rainfall is the observed output
variable. I combine this climate model with a simple, dynamic, two-period agricultural
model of irrigation investment and crop choice. I am interested in testing whether farmers
are updating their expectations of future rainfall, in response to past rainfall. I do not
have explicit information on farmer’s expectations of the weather, however I develop
two sets of conjectured tests for updated expectations, using farmers’ actions in irrigation
investment and crop choice.
I use two agricultural datasets in this paper. The first is a panel household data set
from the ARIS-REDS survey conducted by the NCAER, which covers over 8000 house-
holds over the crop seasons 1970/71, 1981/82 and 1998/99. The second agricultural data
set is a district level data set collected by researchers at the World Bank, covering 271 dis-
tricts for the years 1956-1987. I merge these agricultural data sets with a gridded monthly
rainfall and temperature data set from the University of Delaware that covers the years
1900-2008.
In both data sets, I find evidence that farmers do indeed adapt their irrigation invest-
ment and their crop portfolio in response to variations in the monsoon rainfall regimes.
Specifically, controlling for wealth, farmers invest more in irrigation following decades
that have been particularly dry. And, also controlling for wealth, they plant more area
to drought-tolerant crops following decades that have been particularly dry. In terms of
magnitudes, for a one standard deviation decrease in lagged decade mean rainfall, farm-
ers increase their proportion of irrigated land by 1.6 percentage points and increase the
area planted to drought-tolerant crops by 2.1 percentage points. However, when I esti-
mate the impact on profits of adaptation, I find that the effect is small: farmers are only
able to recoup 14% of the losses that they faced due to negative climate changes.
There are some important caveats to take note of regarding both the adaptation out-
comes that I consider, and the variation in climate that I use. I consider the adapta-
tion outcomes of irrigation investment and crop choice: however there are both larger-
scale adaptations possible (such as migration, or switching out of agriculture), as well as
smaller-scale adaptations possible (such as fertilizer usage and sowing date). Due to data
limitations, I cannot say anything about these other types of adaptation. The other im-
portant caveat is that there has been historical variation in the precipitation of India, but
not the temperature, so I can say something about adaptation to changes in precipitation,
but nothing about adaptation to changes in temperature.
The results of this paper have several important policy implications. The finding that
farmers recover only a comparatively small amount (14%) of the losses due to harmful cli-
mate change, suggests that there may be significant financial and informational barriers
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to adaptation. Financial barriers are likely substantial in the case of irrigation investment,
if credit constraints inhibit households from investing optimally in irrigation. Informa-
tional barriers, such as learning about new crops, may inhibit households from choosing
an optimal crop portfolio. Therefore policies that alleviate these barriers may help farm-
ers adapt to future, anthropogenic climate change.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide background infor-
mation about the monsoon rainfall regimes in India. I also provide some background
information on the crop choice parameters that I will be studying. Section 3 lays out a
theoretical model of climate, irrigation investment and crop choice. Section 4 describes
the data I will use to test empirically the predictions of the model and provides some sum-
mary statistics of key variables. Section 5 explains my empirical strategy. I present my
results in section 6. In Section 7, I present projections for adaptation under anthropogenic
climate change in the medium-run (2010-2039). Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Interdecadal Variability of the Indian Monsoon
Indian agriculture relies heavily on the vagaries of the summer monsoon (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig, 1993; Krishna Kumar et al., 2004). The Indian monsoon arrives in the
state of Kerala in May, and spreads over the entire country in the months of summer. Typ-
ically, excess monsoons are considered to be good for agricultural profits, and deficient
monsoons are considered to be bad for agriculture (Das, 1995). In addition to exhibiting
year-to-year variability, the monsoon of India also exhibits variability on an inter-decadal
time span. Specifically, there are certain decades when the rainfall for all of India is above
its historical average, and other decades when rainfall is below its historical mean. Mete-
orologists refer to these periods as meridional and zonal regimes, respectively (Pant and
Kumar, 1997; Wang, 2006). Figure 1 shows the 31-year moving average of the all-India
summer monsoon rainfall from 1871 (the start of the instrumental record) to present. As
can be seen in the graph, there were two periods where the rainfall for all of India was
above its historical average, roughly from 1870 to 1900 and again during 1930 to 1970, and
two complementary periods during which rainfall was below its historical average. The
red line in the figure represents the moving standard deviation, which also varies over
time. In particular, the rainfall during dry regimes is more variable.
Figure 3 shows the summer rainfall for each year, with the wet (meridional) regimes
shaded gray. According to the meteorological literature, year-to-year rainfall in India is
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not i.i.d, but instead switches back and forth between wet and dry regimes, due to an
atmospheric-oceanic feedback mechanism (Wang, 2006). Hence, instead of facing a single
distribution of rainfall, as in Figure 4, farmers in India actually face two different distribu-
tions of rainfall, depending on what the current rainfall regime is, as displayed in Figure
5. In any given year, there is uncertainty about what the current rainfall regime is. There-
fore, a farmer’s expectation of the next year’s rainfall will vary over time, depending on
what rainfall regime is believed to be faced.
More precisely, we can treat the monsoon as a hidden Markov model, where the un-
observed state variable is regime type (wet or dry) and the observed output variable is
annual rainfall. Wet and dry regimes have different means and standard deviations. In
each period, there is a certain probability of transitioning to the other type of regime.
Farmers know the parameters of the rainfall distribution but they don’t know the state
variable. Hence, lagged rainfall shocks give farmers information about the current regime
that they face.
Although the meteorological literature agrees that the rainfall of India undergoes rain-
fall regimes that vary over time, I was not able to find any meteorological papers that
tested for the statistical significance of the rainfall regimes. In particular, it is important
to know whether the inter-decadal variability of the India monsoon is greater than what
would be expected if the rainfall was i.i.d.3 To address this question, I test for the ex-
istence of two rainfall regimes, against the null hypothesis of a single regime, using the
quasi-likelihood ratio test developed in Cho and White (2007). The distribution of the
test statistic is non-standard due to nuisance parameters that only exist under the alterna-
tive hypothesis; however I am able to use the critical values tabulated in Steigerwald and
Carter (2011) for this purpose. I calculate the test statistic to be 9.61, which is greater than
the tabulated 5% critical value of 5.54, and hence I am able to reject the null hypothesis of
a single regime.
A final important point regarding the monsoon regimes is that there are significant
spatial variations, across India’s thirty different meteorological subdivisions, in the rela-
tive lengths and timings of the wet and dry regimes (Subbaramayya and Naidu, 1992).
Specifically, the rainfall over the easternmost part and the southern tip of the country
tend to go out of phase with the rest of the country (Wang, 2006). This is important for
my identification strategy, as it will allow me to identify adaptation to the rainfall regimes
3If rainfall was actually i.i.d., then lagged rainfall shocks would not give farmers any information about
future rainfall. Therefore, it would be irrational from farmers to adjust their expectations and their farm
practices in response to lagged rainfall (e.g. it would be an example of the hot hand fallacy). Hence, demon-
strating that rainfall is not i.i.d. is important for determining the correct interpretation of my empirical
results.
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separately from smooth time trends in irrigation and crop choice. Figure 2 shows the rain-
fall graphs for all India, as well as for the five meteorological regions. As can be seen from
the figure, the timing of the regimes varies across the different regions. In particular, the
rainfall for the peninsula region is out of phase with the rest of the country.
2.2 Historical Variation of Summer Mean Temperature for India
Since both temperature and precipitation patterns will change for India under future an-
thropogenic climate change, it would be desirable to estimate adaptation to temperature
as well as precipitation. Unfortunately, there is insufficient historical variation in temper-
ature for me to be able to apply the approach I use with precipitation. Figure 6 shows
the 31-year moving average of the all India summer mean temperature. Unlike the corre-
sponding graph for precipitation, summer mean temperature does not exhibit statistically
significant regime-switching behavior. Temperature does exhibit a warming trend, start-
ing roughly in 1965. Note that the magnitude of the warming (roughly 0.1 ◦C per decade),
is half of the magnitude of the rate of warming predicted for the medium-run (2010-2039)
and a quarter of the rate of warming predicted by the end of the century under business
as usual scenarios. However, I cannot test for adaptation due to this temperature trend,
because, unlike the precipitation regimes, there is insufficient cross-sectional variation in
the warming. Hence, it is impossible to separate out historical adaptation to temperature
trends from other smooth time trends, such as changes in technology.
2.3 Background on Crop Choice
Before presenting the model, I now provide a bit of background relating to the crop choice
parameters that I will be studying. According to agronomists at FAO, when studying the
water-intensiveness of different crops, there are two relevant (and distinct) parameters to
consider: crop water need and sensitivity to drought. The water need of a crop is defined
as the amount of water a given crop needs for optimal growth, and is typically defined as
a range, expressed in total millimeters of rainfall per the growing season. A crop’s sensi-
tivity to drought is defined as how much a crop’s yield is diminished if it doesn’t receive
its water requirement. Table 1 presents these two parameters for the major crops of India.
As can be seen from the table, the two parameters are distinct and not tightly correlated.
For example, cotton and sugarcane both have relatively high water needs, however cot-
ton exhibits a low-sensitivity to drought, whereas sugarcane is highly drought-sensitive.
Similarly, rice and sorghum both have moderate water needs relative to other crops of
India, but rice is highly sensitive to drought whereas sorghum is drought-tolerant.
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3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present a formal model of the monsoon rainfall regimes. I then develop a
simple, dynamic two-period agricultural model of irrigation investment and crop choice.
Lastly, based on the climate and agriculture models, I describe two sets of conjectured
tests that can be used for testing whether farmers are adapting to variation in the monsoon
rainfall regimes.
3.1 Climate
I develop a model in which the monsoon rainfall follows a hidden Markov model. Let
growing season rainfall in year t, rt, be given by
rt = θ0 + δSt +Ut (1)
where Ut ∼ i.i.d.N(0, ν).4 The unobserved state variable St ∈ {0, 1} indicates regimes,
with St = 0 corresponding to a dry regime, and St = 1 corresponding to a wet regime,
and δ > 0. Furthermore, the sequence {St}Tt=1 is generated as a first-order Markov process
with Pr(St = 1 | St−1 = 0) = p0 and Pr(St = 0 | St−1 = 1) = p1. Hence the mean rainfall
during a dry regime is θ0 and the mean rainfall during a wet regime is θ1 = θ0 + δ.
I assume that farmers know all the climate parameters (e.g. θ0, δ, ν, p0 and p1) and
that they observe rt but that they do not observe St.5 For modeling purposes, I assume
that the Markov process is duration-independent, in other words that the probability of
switching to the other regime type depends only on the current regime, not how long you
have been in the current regime.
3.2 Irrigation and Crop Choice
I develop a simple two-period model of irrigation investment and crop choice. In period
t, a farmer has wealth wt which he can allocate between an irrigation asset it and another
agricultural (non-irrigation) asset at, such that at + it = wt. I assume that there are no
credit markets and no non-agricultural assets. The farmer has one unit of land, on which
he plants a proportion ρt to a drought-tolerant crop and 1− ρt to a drought-neutral crop.
The profit function for a farmer is given by:
4The growing season rainfall is for location j, e.g. either a specific village or a specific district. I drop the
subscript j for notational simplicity, but the variables Rt, θ0, δ, St, Ut and ν all vary at the local level.
5Theoretically, a farmer could know about rainfall at other locations and use this to develop his predic-
tions about the current regime type, but I abstract away from this possibility.
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pit = βaat + βiit + βρρt +
1
2
δaaa2t +
1
2
δiii2t + δiitrt + δρρtrt + δrrt + et (2)
where pit is profits per acre, and et is a mean zero productivity shock. In order to
develop my tests for adaptation, I need to make several assumptions about the coefficients
of the profit function. I will test these assumptions in the empirical part of the paper.
Specifically I need to assume the following coefficient signs:
• Return to rainfall: assume δr > 0. I need the assumption that profits are higher
during wet years than they are during dry years. This is generally agreed upon for
the literature in India (see, for example, Jayachandran (2006)). Additionally, I test
this empirically in Section 6.1.
• Return to irrigation: assume δi < 0. I need the assumption that the return to ir-
rigation is higher during dry years than it is during wet years. Again, I test this
empirically in Section 6.1.
• Return to crop choice: assume δρ < 0. I need the assumption that the return to
planting drought-tolerant crops is higher during dry years than it is during wet
years. This follows from the definition of being drought-tolerant.
Given the above profit function, a farmer maximizes u(c1) + βE1[u(c2)], where 0 <
β < 1, subject to the budget constraints c1 + w2 = w1 + pi1 and c2 = w2 + pi2. I assume
that the farmer’s utility function exhibits decreasing relative risk-aversion.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. First, farmer chooses i1 and ρ1, given w1, E0[r1] and E0[r2].
2. Then, r1 and pi1 are realized.
3. Then, the farmer chooses c1 and w2, given w1 + pi1 and E1[r2].
4. Then, the farmer chooses i2 and ρ2, given w2 and E1[r2].
5. Lastly, r2 and pi2 are realized.
The model can be solved using the Euler equation: u′(c1) = βE1[u′(c2)]. That is to
say, the optimal consumption decision will equate the marginal utility of first-period con-
sumption with the expected marginal utility of second-period consumption. The optimal
second-period irrigation and crop choice decisions can be written as i∗2(w2, E1(r2)) and
ρ∗2(w2, E1(r2)). Furthermore, the optimal second-period wealth decision can be written
as: w∗2(w1, E0[r1], r1, E1[r2]). I have not yet solved explicitly for these expressions.
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3.3 Testing for Adaptation to Climate Change
Given the above model and the above assumptions, I can develop some tests to see
whether farmers are adapting to changes in their climate. Specifically, I want to test
whether
dE1(r2)
dr1
> 0 or
dE1(r2)
dr1
= 0. Can we infer whether farmers are updating their
rainfall expectations by looking at the response of irrigation (or crop choice) to lagged
rainfall? I first discuss the case for irrigation, and then for crop choice.
3.3.1 Testing for Adaptation via Irrigation Investment
I am interested in whether we can infer that farmers are updating their rainfall expecta-
tions by looking at the response of irrigation to lagged rainfall. Note that:
di∗2
dr1
=
∂i∗2
∂w∗2
dw∗2
dr1
+
∂i∗2
∂E1(r2)
dE1(r2)
dr1
=
∂i∗2
∂w∗2
[
∂w∗2
∂r1
+
∂w∗2
∂E1(r2)
dE1(r2)
dr1
]
+
∂i∗2
∂E1(r2)
dE1(r2)
dr1
Rearranging terms, we get:
di∗2
dr1
=
∂i∗2
∂w∗2
∂w∗2
∂r1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth effect
+
[
∂i∗2
∂w∗2
∂w∗2
∂E1(r2)
+
∂i∗2
∂E1(r2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expectations effect
dE1(r2)
dr1
Therefore, the total derivative of second period irrigation with respect to first period
rainfall can be written as the sum of a wealth effect and an expectations effect. For irri-
gation investment, I conjecture that the wealth effect term is positive and that the expec-
tations effect term is negative. Specifically, for the wealth effect term: more rainfall in the
first period means that farmers have more wealth, which means they should invest more
in all assets, including irrigation. However, the expectations effect goes in the opposite
direction: more rainfall in the first period means that farmers expect higher rainfall in
the second period, which means they should invest less in irrigation (since the return to
irrigation is lower during wet years).
Based on these (conjectured) signs of the wealth and expectation effects, I can develop
two tests for whether farmers are updating their expectations of rainfall.
• Conjectured Irrigation Test 1 (Unconditional): If farmers invest more in irrigation
after a low rainfall realization, this implies they are updating their rainfall expecta-
tions.
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– Specifically, if
di∗2
dr1
< 0, then
dE1(r2)
dr1
> 0.
• Conjectured Irrigation Test 2 (Conditional on wealth): If, conditional on wealth,
farmers invest more in irrigation after a low rainfall realization, this implies they
are updating their rainfall expectations.
– Specifically, if
di∗2
dr1
∣∣∣∣
w∗2=constant
< 0, then
dE1(r2)
dr1
> 0.
3.3.2 Testing for Adaptation via Crop Choice
I am also interested in whether we can infer that farmers are updating their rainfall ex-
pectations by looking at the response of crop choice to lagged rainfall. I can take the total
derivative of second period crop choice with respect to first period rainfall. If I again
apply the chain-rule and rearrange terms, I get the following expression:
dρ∗2
dr1
=
∂ρ∗2
∂w∗2
∂w∗2
∂r1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wealth effect
+
[
∂ρ∗2
∂w∗2
∂w∗2
∂E1(r2)
+
∂ρ∗2
∂E1(r2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expectations effect
dE1(r2)
dr1
For crop choice, I conjecture that both the wealth effect term and the expectations effect
term are negative. For the wealth effect: more rainfall in the first period means that the
farmer has more wealth, which means that the farmer is less risk-averse, which means
the farmer should plant less area to the drought-tolerant crop. For the expectations effect:
more rainfall in the first period means that the farmer expects higher rainfall in the second
period, which means that the farmer should plant less area to the drought-tolerant crop
(since it has a lower return during wet years).
Based on these (conjectured) signs of the wealth and expectation effects, I can develop
one test for whether farmers are updating their expectations of rainfall.
• Conjectured Crop Choice Test 1 (Conditional on wealth): If, conditional on wealth,
farmers plant more to drought-tolerant crops after a low rainfall realization, this
implies they are updating their rainfall expectations.
– Specifically, if
dρ∗2
dr1
∣∣∣∣
w∗2=constant
< 0, then
dE1(r2)
dr1
> 0.
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4 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
4.1 Data
My first agricultural data set comes from the Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS)
and the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), both of which were collected
by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in Delhi. The ARIS/REDS
dataset is a panel household dataset that covers the agricultural years 1970/71, 1981/82
and 1998/99. The survey collects detailed data on agricultural outcomes, including as-
sets, inputs, and profits. The 1971 round covers approximately 4500 households in over
250 villages across 17 states of India. The 1982 round covers approximately 5000 house-
holds, of which roughly two thirds are the same as from the 1971 round. The 1999 round
covers approximately 7500 households. The 1999 round includes all households from
1982 (including households that split off from the original 1982 households), as well as
some new households.6
I also use a district-level agricultural dataset, the ”India Agriculture and Climate Data
Set” which was collected by a World Bank research group (Sanghi et al., 1998). This data
set compiles detailed district-level data from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and other
official sources, and it includes outcome variables such as yearly agricultural production,
output prices and acreage planted and cultivated for 271 districts across 14 states, cov-
ering 85% of India’s area. The dataset covers the crop years from 1956/57 to 1986/87,
with annual frequency. The dataset is missing several of the outcome variables covered
by the ARIS/REDS dataset, including agricultural assets, inputs and profits.7 However,
I am able use agricultural yields in place of profits. And, the dataset does have data on
irrigated area, and proportion of area planted to different crops.
For weather data, I merge the agricultural datasets with a monthly rainfall dataset that
is constructed on a 0.5◦ latitude by 0.5◦ longitude grid. The rainfall data set, Terrestrial
Precipitation: Monthly Time Series (1900-2008), version 2.01, was constructed by Kenji
Matsuura and Cort J. Willmott (with support from IGES and NASA) at the Center for
Climatic Research, University of Delaware. The rainfall measure for a latitude-longitude
grid point combines data from 20 nearby weather stations using an interpolation algo-
rithm based on the spherical version of Shepards distance-weighting method. I use the
rainfall from the grid point nearest to each village in the ARIS/REDS dataset. For the
6Because my empirical strategy relies on dynasty fixed effects (see Section 5), I only use households that
are members of dynasties that are interviewed in at least two of the three rounds. (I am able to include both
panel households and households that split off from panel households.)
7The dataset does have some limited data on assets and inputs, but they are unreliable.
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district data set, I use the rainfall from the grid point nearest to the district center.8
For my rainfall measure, I use growing season rainfall, which I define as the sum
of rainfall for June through September for most of the country (which corresponds to
the main summer monsoon) and which I define as the sum of rainfall for June through
December for the states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh (which corresponds to both
the main summer monsoon and the winter monsoon, which impacts these states the most,
following the state-specific rainfall monthly charts in Pant and Kumar (1997)).
4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2 gives summary statistics for the ARIS/REDS dataset. As can be seen from the
table, farm profits per acre are increasing over time for the period 1971 to 1999, as is the
proportion of irrigated land. Table 3 gives summary statistics for the World Bank dataset.
In this dataset, proportion of land irrigated is also increasing over time.
5 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I outline my empirical strategy. I begin with my strategy for estimating
the return to irrigation, and then I describe my strategies for testing whether farmers are
adapting their irrigation investment and their crop portfolio to variations in the monsoon
regimes.
5.1 Return to Irrigation
Let piijt represent agricultural profits per acre for farmer i, in village j, in year t. I estimate
a profit function of the form:
piijt = β1rainjt + β2propirrijt + β3rainjt ∗ propirrijt + nonlandwealthijt +
+temperaturejt + yeart + f armerij + eijt (3)
where rainjt is the deviation of current growing season rainfall for the village from its
historical mean, expressed as a z-scores, and propirrijt is the proportion of the farmer’s
land that is irrigated. The term nonlandwealthijt represents the non-land wealth of the
8I also control for temperature in some of the regressions that I run. I use the companion temperature
data set Terrestrial Air Temperature: 1900-2008 Gridded Monthly Time Series, version 2.01, which was
constructed by the same researchers and using the same methodologies.
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farmer and the term temperaturejt represents the mean growing season temperature in
the village that year, expressed as a z-score deviation from its historical mean. The term
yeart is a year fixed effect that controls for nation-wide year specific shocks, as well as
any longer-term nation-wide trends. The term f armerij is a farmer fixed effect that con-
trols for any time-invariant unobserved farmer ability that may be correlated with both
pro f itijt and propirrijt.9 Additionally, I instrument for propirrijt with the proportion of
inherited land that was irrigated. This instrumental variables strategy alleviates two po-
tential concerns. The first concern is that farmers who have higher ability will adopt
irrigation earlier, and that this will not be captured by the farmer fixed effect. The sec-
ond concern is that unobserved (non-weather) shocks, such as health shocks, could be
an omitted variable that affects both propirrijt and pro f itijt. Both of these concerns are
allayed by instrumenting with proportion of inherited land that was irrigated .
Based on the assumptions outlined in Section 3.2, I expect β1 > 0 (profits are higher
in wet years than in dry years) and β3 < 0 (the return to irrigation is higher in dry years
than in wet years). Additionally, I expect that β2 > 0 (having irrigation increases profits,
independent of rainfall).
5.2 Testing for Adaptation via Irrigation Investment
I next estimate a regression to see how the proportion of land irrigated responds to lagged
rainfall shocks, and specifically to test whether farmers are adapting their irrigation in-
vestment in response to the rainfall regimes. I run a regression of the form:
irr invijt = α1decaderainjt + α2L.rainjt + yeart + f armerij + eijt (4)
where irr invijt is a dummy variable for whether the household invested in irriga-
tion during the survey year.10 The term decaderainjt is the average rainfall over the past
decade. I control for one-year-lagged rainfall, L.rainjt, because of the possible concern
that last year’s rainfall might directly affect the decision to invest in irrigation directly, not
through expectations of future weather.11 The year fixed effect controls for nation-wide
time trends in irrigation investment. The farmer fixed effect controls for time-invariant
factors (such as soil-quality) that might affect the household’s decision to invest in irri-
9Since the household head may change across survey rounds, and the household may split into addi-
tional households, the farmer fixed effect is really best thought of as a dynasty fixed effect that controls for
unobserved agricultural ability that is common to all parts of the dynasty.
10For the district-level data set I don’t have data on irrigation investment explicitly, so I use the one-year
change in the net irrigated area of the district as the dependent variable.
11This could happen if last year’s rainfall continues to affect soil moisture in the following year.
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gation. The coefficient of interest is α1: specifically, is a household more likely to invest
in irrigation following especially wet decades or following especially dry decades? My
model is ambiguous about the sign of α1 in this regression: if the wealth effect dominates,
then α1 > 0; but if the adaptation effect dominates, then α1 < 0. Finding a negative
coefficient demonstrates that farmers are adapting to the changes in their climate.
I also run another specification in which I control for non-land wealth:
irr invijt = α1decaderainjt + α2L.rainjt + nonlandwealthijt + yeart + f armerij + eijt (5)
In this regression, the model unambiguously predicts that α1 < 0. In other words,
since I am controlling for wealth, the coefficient on α1 is purely due to adaptation. In
this regression, there is a concern that non-weather shocks, such as health shocks, might
affect both nonlandwealthijt and irr invijt. Therefore, I use inherited non-land wealth as
an instrument for nonlandwealthijt.12
5.3 Testing for Adaptation via Crop Choice
I next estimate regressions to see how a farmer’s crop portfolio responds to lagged rain-
fall shocks, and specifically to test whether farmers are adapting their crop portfolio in
response to the rainfall regimes. As described in Section 2.3, I have two crop parameters
of interest: crop water requirement (the amount of water a specific crop needs to grow
optimally), and crop sensitivity to drought (how much a crop’s yield is diminished if its
optimal water requirement is not met). I use the crop water requirements and drought
sensitivities given in a FAO manual (Brouwer and Heibloem, 1986), as reproduced in Ta-
ble 1. Crop water needs are given in millimeters per growing season; drought sensitivity
is a discrete variable with four categories: low, low-medium, medium-high, or high. From
the values in the table, I construct three different measures of the water-intensiveness of
a farmer’s crop portfolio: water needijt, area tolerantijt and area sensitiveijt. The variable
water needijt is defined as area-weighted average water need of the farmer’s crop port-
folio.13 The variable area tolerantijt is defined as the proportion of cultivated area that is
planted to crops with low drought sensitivity. And similarly, the proportion of cultivated
12I am able to use this instrument at the same time that I use the farmer fixed effects, due to the household
splits. E.g. some parts of the dynasty have different inherited wealth. Also, I use non-land wealth because
land markets in India are very inactive, so land prices are unreliable, and land wealth is not easily converted
into other forms of wealth.
13Crop water needs are given as a range in the FAO table; I use the median of the range for each crop,
when constructing water needijt
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area that is planted to crops with high drought sensitivity is called area sensitiveijt.
I run regressions with all three of these outcome variables, to test whether they re-
spond to lagged rainfall. Specifically, I run regressions of the form:
crop varijt = α1decaderainjt + α2rainjt + nonlandwealthijt + yeart + f armerij + eijt (6)
where crop varijt is water needijt, or area tolerantijt, or area sensitiveijt. As above, decaderainjt
measures the average rainfall of the previous decade. I control for current year rainfall
because farmers may have some knowledge of the current year rainfall (e.g. the mon-
soon start date) before they choose which crops to plant.14 Since the adaptation effects
and wealth effects go in the same direction for crop choice (see Section 3.3.2), I con-
trol for nonlandwealthijt in all regressions. And again, I instrument for non-land wealth
with inherited non-land wealth, to alleviate the concern that unobserved, non-weather
shocks, such as health shocks, might affect both nonlandwealthijt and crop varijt. Con-
ditional on wealth, the model unambiguously predicts that α1 > 0 for water needijt and
area sensitiveijt, and that α1 < 0 for area tolerantijt. In other words, if farmers are adapt-
ing to change in their climate, they should plant a crop portfolio that requires more water,
if recent years of rainfall have been above average. Additionally, farmers should plant
more area to crops that are drought sensitive, if recent years of rainfall have been above
average. And lastly, farmers should plant less area to crops that are drought sensitive,
if recent years of rainfall have been above average. Finding these results would indicate
that farmers are adapting their crop portfolio in response to the variations in the monsoon
regimes.
5.4 Rainfall Specifications
For the regressions where I test for adaptation via irrigation investment or crop choice,
I use two different specifications of lagged decade rainfall. Let rainjt be the deviation of
current year rainfall from its historical mean for the village, expressed as a z-score. In
Specification 1, I simply use mean rainfall over the past decade, e.g.
14Accordingly to evidence from Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1993), the monsoon start date is the most
important factor for determining crop profits. Hence, there might be some concern that farmer should
just use the monsoon start date to determine what crops to plant, and not use the decade lagged rainfall.
However, both measures are noisy, so it can help farmers to use both measures. Additionally, if there are
costs associated with switching from one crop to another (e.g. learning costs or investment costs), then
farmers might want to use predictions based on decade lagged rainfall, since this gives predictions of what
rainfall will be, on average, over the next several years.
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1
10
10
∑
k=1
Lk(rainjt)
In Specification 2, I use the prevalence of especially wet or especially dry years over
past decade. In particular, in the regression I control for both
1
10
10
∑
k=1
Lk(1{rainjtin lowest quintile})
and
1
10
10
∑
k=1
Lk(1{rainjt in highest quintile})
The idea with the second specification is that especially wet or especially dry years
may be more salient to farmers, and that they may respond more to these especially wet
or dry shocks than they do the mean decade rainfall. Additionally, these specifications
may have more econometric power to identify an effect, than the specifications using
mean lagged rainfall.
6 Results
6.1 Return to Irrigation
The results of the regression for the return to irrigation are given in Table 4. The first
two columns give the results for the REDS dataset and the dependent variable is profits
per acre. Note that column 1 deducts the value of family labor as equal to the market
wage, and column 2 does not deduct family labor (e.g. sets its shadow value equal to
zero). As can be seen from the table, higher rainfall is good for profits. In particular, the
coefficient on indicator for ”rainfall above the 80th percentile” is positive. The coefficient
on proportion land irrigated is positive, indicating that irrigation increases profits in a
level sense. However, the interaction between proportion land irrigated and ”rainfall
above the 80th percentile” is negative, indicating that the return to irrigation is higher
during dry years than it is during wet years. Hence, both of the assumptions outlined in
Section 3.2 are borne out by the data.
The results of the regression for the return to irrigation for the WB data set are given
in column 3 of Table 4. Similarly to the household data set, it can be seen from the table
that crop yields are higher during wet years than they are during dry years, and that the
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return to irrigation is higher during dry years than it is during wet years.
6.2 Testing for Adaptation via Irrigation Investment
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions that test whether farmers adapt their irriga-
tion investment in response to the rainfall regimes. The first four columns use the REDS
data and the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household invested in
irrigation during the recall period of the survey. In column 1, I regress the proportion of
land irrigated on lagged mean rainfall from the past decade, without including a control
for wealth. The coefficient on lagged rainfall is negative which supports an adaptation
story: farmers are investing more in irrigation after decades that have been especially
dry. In column 2, I control for non-land wealth and instrument for it with inherited non-
land wealth. The coefficient on lagged rainfall remains negative, which also supports an
adaptation story.
In columns 3 and 4, I repeat the same specification but use a different measure of
lagged rainfall: the proportion of years in the past decade that were above the 80th per-
centile for rain, and the proportion that were below the 20th percentile. Again, I find
evidence of an adaptation effect: farmers invest less in irrigation if there have been a lot
of especially wet years in the past decade.
Using the standard deviation of the lagged rainfall variables presented in Table 2,
along with the estimated response coefficient from column 1, I find that probability of
investing in irrigation goes up by 1.5 percentage points, for a one standard-deviation
change in the lagged rainfall variable. Since the average probability of investing in irriga-
tion during the recall period is 5%, this is a substantial effect.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 test for adaptation via irrigation, using the WB district-
level data set. Here the dependent variable is the one-year change in irrigated area at
the district level. Similarly to the household-level data set, investment in irrigation is
higher after decades that have been particularly dry, which supports an adaptation story
in which farmers are updating their expectations over future weather, based on past rain-
fall shocks.
6.3 Testing for Adaptation via Crop Choice
Table 6 presents the results of the regressions that test whether farmers adapt their crop
portfolio in response to the rainfall regimes. In all columns, I use the specification where I
measure lagged rainfall based on the proportion of wet and dry shocks (e.g. years above
the 80th percentile or below the 20th percentile) in the past decade. The first three columns
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of the table use the REDS data. In the first column, we see that, conditional on wealth,
having more wet shocks and having less dry shocks leads to higher water needs of the
crops, which is consistent with an adaptation effect. In the second column, I test how
the proportion of area planted to drought-tolerant crops responds to lagged rainfall from
the past decade. I find that farmers plant less area to drought-tolerant crops following a
decade with lots of especially wet shocks, which is consistent with an adaptation effect.
Lastly, in column 3 I explore how lagged rainfall affects the proportion of area planted to
highly drought sensitive crops. I find that the area of drought-sensitive crops goes down
if there have been a lot of very dry (below the 20th percentile) years in the past decade for
that village. Appendix Table 7 replicates the same specification as Table 6, but uses mean
rainfall from the past decade, instead of the wet and dry shock specification.
In columns 4-6 of Table 6, I present the results of the test for adaptation via crop choice
with the World Bank dataset. The results for crop water need (column 4) and area planted
to drought tolerant crops (column 5) follow the same patterns as the results for the REDS
data, and are consistent with an adaptation story. However, since I don’t have a control
for wealth in the WB specification, it is possible that these effects are driven by a wealth
effect. However, in column 6 I get the unexpected results that farmers plant more area to
drought-sensitive crops after a decade with lots of dry shocks. This result is consistent
with neither an adaptation effect, nor with a wealth effect. When I look at each drought-
sensitive crop individually, I get that the result is driven by rice (table not shown). I am
still looking into what could be driving this unexpected effect.
7 Extensions
In this section, I extend my results in two directions. First, I estimate the extent to which
farmers are able to protect their profits from harmful variations in the climate, based
on climate variations in my historical sample. Secondly, I use my estimates of adapta-
tion to historical variations in the climate to construct projections for future adaptation
to climate change, under a counterfactual scenario in which there are changes in future
precipitation, but no changes in future temperature.
7.1 Impact of Adaptation on Profits
I estimate the impact of adaptation on profits, for the period 1971-1999, using the REDS
data. Recall that, during this period, rainfall for most of India was below its historical
mean. I am interested in calculating how much lower profits were, due to the deficient
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rainfall during this period. I am also interested in calculating what fraction of lost profits
farmers were able to recoup, via adaptation.
I am not able to calculate the impact of crop choice adaptation on profits, because I do
not have an unbiased estimate of the impact of crop choice on profits.15 However, I am
able to calculate the impact of irrigation adaptation on profits. I use the estimated coef-
ficients from Table 4, column 2 to get the return to irrigation. To calculate the adaptive
response to lagged rainfall, I use the coefficients from a specification similar to my main
irrigation adaptation table (e.g. Table 5), except that the dependent variable is the propor-
tion of land irrigated, instead of being an indicator for whether the household invested in
irrigation during the recall period (table not reported).16
Table 8 presents the impact of irrigation adaptation on profits. All currency amounts
are measured in 1971 Rs. The first six rows of the table present how the realized climate for
1971-1999 differed from the historical mean. In particular, we can see that during the pe-
riod 1971-1999 there were more years with rainfall below the 20th percentile, than would
be expected based on the historical distribution, and fewer years with rainfall above the
80th percentile. Furthermore, mean rainfall for the period, measured as a z-score devia-
tion from the historical mean, was -0.0256.
The final two rows of the table present actual and counterfactual profits, with and
without adaptation. Actual realized mean annual profits (inclusive of adaptation) for the
period 1971-1999 were 614.7 Rs/acre. If farmers had not adapted, profits would have
been lower: 613.8 Rs/acre. And, if rainfall had not been below average, but had instead
remained at its historical mean, average annual profits would have been higher: 620.2
Rs/acre. In particular, average profits during this period were about 1% lower due to
drier regime.17 Due to adaptation via irrigation, households were able to recoup 14% of
their lost profits. Hence, the majority of lost profits were not recovered via adaptation.
Note that Guiteras (2009) predicts that crop yields in India will be 4.5 to 9% lower
in the medium run (2010-2039) due to anthropogenic climate change. His estimates are
an upper bound, since he employs the panel approach, which assumes zero adaptation.
However, if we extrapolate my results on adaptation, and specifically assume that farm-
ers will recoup 14% of total losses, then the actual impact on crop yields, inclusive of
15Specifically, area planted to drought-tolerant rips is a choice variable, and I don’t have an appropriate
instrument for it. Unobserved shocks, such as health shocks, may be correlated with both profits and with
drought-tolerant area, and hence a regression of profits on drought-tolerant area will be biased.
16I use this alternative specification because in the data I don’t know what fraction of the farmer’s land
becomes irrigated when then invest in irrigation, so I need to use the alternative specification to calculate
the impact of adaptation on profits, since profits depend on proportion of land irrigated.
17Note that there is heterogeneity in the timing of the dry regime, and some households had net increase
in profits. For households with net losses, average losses due to the drier regime were about 3%.
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adaptation, will be more like 3.9 to 7.7%, which is still substantial.
7.2 Adaptation Projections for a Counterfactual Climate Change Sce-
nario
I now use the estimates of adaptation to historical variations in the climate to construct
projections for future adaptation to climate change, under a counterfactual climate change
scenario of an increase in precipitation, but no increase in temperature. Before present-
ing the projections, I will discuss one strength of my projections, followed by several
important caveats. In the medium-run (2012-2039), India’s mean summer temperature is
expected to increase by 0.5◦C, and India’s summer rainfall is expected to increase by 4%,
according to the business-as-usual scenario from the IPCC 4th assessment report (Chris-
tensen and Hewitson, 2007). One strength of my projections is that the projected increase
in precipitation is very similar to the magnitude of precipitation changes under the mon-
soon rainfall regimes. Hence, I don’t have to worry about making predictions based on
very different magnitudes of rainfall change.
However, there are several important caveats to consider. The most important caveat
is that I don’t have any projections for adaptation to temperature, since there is no statis-
tically significant variation in temperature across the monsoon regimes. A second caveat
is that there is uncertainty over the climate change predictions, especially precipitation.
Different models have different predictions for India’s future precipitation. Therefore,
the actual change in precipitation over the next thirty years may be greater or less than
4%. A third caveat is that in addition to the 4% increase in mean summer precipitation,
it is also possible that there will be increases in year-to-year variability of rainfall, as well
as potential changes to intra-seasonal patterns of precipitation (e.g. break periods in the
monsoon). These changes could have impacts on farmers irrigation and crop choice de-
cisions. A fourth caveat is that adaptation to a future precipitation trend may be different
than adaptation to historical rainfall regimes. A fifth caveat is that there are trends in
covariates, such as income, wealth, land size and technology, all of which impact irriga-
tion and crop choice decisions, and none of which I am controlling for. A sixth and final
caveat is under anthropogenic climate change there are likely to be price effects which
will diminish the magnitude of adaptation that occurs. This will in particular be true
if the changes in precipitation under anthropogenic climate change exhibit less spatial
variation than the changes of precipitation under the monsoon rainfall regimes.
In sum, the projections I am about to present should not be thought of as accurate pre-
dictions of the future, but rather as limited projections of how adaptation to new precipi-
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tation levels may impact future irrigation and crop choice decisions. With these caveats in
mind, I present Table 9, which shows the outcome variables of proportion land irrigated,
average water need of crop portfolios, and proportion of area planted to drought-tolerant
and drought-sensitive crops. In the first column, I present the values of these outcome
variables for the year 1999, based on the REDS household data, using the household
weight that make the data set nationally representative. In column 2, I present projec-
tions for the outcome variables for 2039, under a scenario of no adaptation. Since there is
no evidence of a trend for the crop choice variables, for those three variables the values are
the same as the 1999 values. However, proportion of land irrigated indicates a clear lin-
ear increasing trend in the household dataset, so I include that trend: specifically I project
that proportion of land irrigated will increase from 0.483 to 0.645 (absent any adaptation).
Column 3 shows the projections for the outcome variables, allowing for adaptation, and
using the adaptation response estimated from the REDS data.18 Column 4 reports the
change in each outcome variable due to adaptation. I project that the proportion of land
irrigated will decrease 11 percentage points, relative to its increasing historical trend. I
project that the average water need of crop portfolio will decrease by 51 millimeters. I
project that the proportion of area planted to drought tolerant crops will decrease by 16
percentage points and the proportion planted to drought-sensitive crops will increase by
15 percentage points.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that we can use historical variation in the India monsoon to
test whether farmers have been adapting to medium-run changes in their climate. The
Indian monsoon undergoes zonal and meridional regimes, in which droughts or floods
are more common respectively, and these regimes last several decades. I find evidence
that farmers adjust their irrigation investment and the water-intensiveness of their crop
portfolio depending on which monsoon regime they currently face. Specifically, for a
one standard deviation decrease of the lagged mean rainfall variable, farmers increase
their proportion of irrigated land by 1.6 percentage points and increase the area planted
to drought-tolerant crops by 2.1 percentage points. However, I find that adaptation only
enables farmers to recover 14% of the profits that they have lost due to harmful changes
in their climate.
18In Table 5, I estimate the adaptation response using the dependent variable that is an indicator for
whether the household invested in irrigation during the recall period. For the projections, I am interested in
the stock of irrigated land, so I use an alternative specification (not reported) where the dependent variable
is the proportion of land irrigated.
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In sum, I find that farmer do indeed adapt to changes in their climate, but that there
ability to protect their agricultural profits via adaptation appears to be very limited. This
suggests that there may be substantial financial and informational barriers to adaptation.
In the case of irrigation investment, credit constraints clearly may inhibit optimal invest-
ment and adaptation. And in the case of crop choice, lack of knowledge about different
crop types may inhibit adaptation. Future work needs to be done in order to address the
issues of what institutions, infrastructures, technologies and policies best support adap-
tation. Future work should also explore in more detail what the various financial and
informational barriers to adaptation are. Lastly, future work should explore how adap-
tive capacity varies across different sub-populations.
References
H.P. Binswanger and M.R. Rosenzweig. Wealth, Weather Risk and the Composition of
Agriculture Investments. The Economic Journal, January, pages 1–24, 1993.
C Brouwer and M Heibloem. Irrigation Water Management TrainingManual No. 3: Irrigation
Water Needs. FAO, May 1986.
R. Burgess, O. Deschenes, D. Donaldson, and M. Greenstone. Weather and Death in India.
pages 1–50, April 2011.
J.S. Cho and H. White. Testing for regime switching. Econometrica, 75(6):1671–1720, 2007.
Jens Hesselbjerg Christensen and Bruce Hewitson. Regional climate projections. In Cli-
mate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, pages 847–940. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007.
P K Das. The Monsoons. National Book Trust, India, New Delhi, 3rd edition, 1995.
R.M. Fishman. Climate Change, Rainfall Variability, and Adaptation through Irrigation:
Evidence from Indian Agriculture. 2011.
R. Guiteras. The impact of climate change on Indian agriculture. Manuscript, Department
of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, October 2009.
CE Hanson, PJ van der Linden, JP Palutikof, OF Canziani, and ML Parry, editors. Climate
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovenmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007.
R. Hornbeck. The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short and Long-run
Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe. National Bureau of Economic Research,
2009.
24
S. Jayachandran. Selling labor low: Wage responses to productivity shocks in developing
countries. Journal of political Economy, 114(3):538–575, 2006.
Shakeel A. Khan, Sanjeev Kumar, MZ Hussain, and N Kalra. Climate Change, Climate
Variability and Indian Agriculture: Impacts Vulnerability and Adaptation Strategies.
In S N Singh, editor, Climate Change and Crops. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Hei-
delberg, 2009.
K Krishna Kumar, K Rupa Kumar, R G Ashrit, N R Deshpande, and J W Hansen. Climate
impacts on Indian agriculture. International Journal of Climatology, 24(11):1375–1393,
August 2004.
Pradeep Kurukulasuriya, Namrata Kala, and Robert Mendelsohn. Adaptation And Cli-
mate Change Impacts: A Structural Ricardian Model Of Irrigation And Farm Income
In Africa. Climate Change Economics (CCE), 2(02):149–174, 2011.
G B Pant and K Rupa Kumar. Climates of South Asia. Wiley, April 1997.
Apurva Sanghi and Robert Mendelsohn. The impacts of global warming on farmers in
Brazil and India. Global Environmental Change, 18(4):655–665, October 2008.
Apurva Sanghi, KS Kavi Kumar, and James W McKinsey Jr. India agriculture and climate
dataset. Technical report, 1998.
S Niggol Seo and Robert Mendelsohn. An analysis of crop choice: Adapting to climate
change in South American farms. Ecological Economics, 67(1):109–116, August 2008a.
S Niggol Seo, Bruce A McCarl, and Robert Mendelsohn. From beef cattle to sheep un-
der global warming? An analysis of adaptation by livestock species choice in South
America. Ecological Economics, 69(12):2486–2494, October 2010.
S.N. Seo and R. Mendelsohn. Climate change impacts on Latin American farmland val-
ues: the role of farm type. Revista de Economia e Agronegocio/Brazilian Review of Economics
and Agribusiness, 6(2), 2008b.
D. Steigerwald and A. Carter. Markov Regime-Switching Tests: Asymptotic Critical Values.
2011.
I. Subbaramayya and CV Naidu. Spatial variations and trends in the Indian monsoon
rainfall. International Journal of Climatology, 12(6):597–609, 1992.
Bin Wang. The Asian Monsoon. Springer, May 2006.
25
Figure 1: Moving Average of the Indian Monsoon
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Figure 2: 31-year moving average of summer rainfall, for all-India and for the five mete-
orological regions
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Figure 3: All India Summer Monsoon (AISMR)
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Figure 5: Histogram
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Figure 6: Moving Average of Temperature
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Table 1: Crop Water Needs and Sensitivity to Drought
Crop
Crop water need
(mm/total growing period) Sensitivity to drought
Barley 450-650 low-medium
Cotton 700-1300 low
Maize 500-800 medium-high
Millet 450-650 low
Peanut 500-700 low-medium
Potato 500-700 high
Pulses 350-500 medium-high
Rice 450-700 high
Sorghum 450-650 low
Soybean 450-700 low-medium
Sugarcane 1500-2500 high
Sunflower 600-1000 low-medium
Wheat 450-650 low-medium
Source: Brouwer and Heibloem (1986)
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Table 2: [REDS] Summary Statistics
1971 1982 1999
Profits per acre (1971 Rs.) 502.96 586.6 741.7
(440.9) (654.9) (940.0)
Profits per acre, deducting family labor (1971 Rs.) - 375.3 425.3
(530.9) (819.2)
Proportion land irrigated 0.378 0.414 0.483
(0.437) (0.455) (0.466)
Irrigation investment during RP (dummy) 0.0767 0.0724 0.0116
(0.266) (0.259) (0.107)
Nonland wealth (1971 Rs.) 5591.6 2656.9 18217.9
(7287.2) (5717.8) (28808.6)
Average water need of crop portfolio - 576.4 583.8
(67.69) (82.86)
Proportion area planted to drought-tolerant crops - 0.264 0.166
(0.340) (0.314)
Proportion area planted to drought-sensitive crops - 0.392 0.476
(0.391) (0.395)
Current year rain 0.313 0.208 0.279
(0.929) (0.772) (0.723)
10-yr lagged average rain -0.000634 0.0653 -0.0303
(0.328) (0.251) (0.326)
10-yr lagged average of dry shock 0.196 0.183 0.166
(0.125) (0.0925) (0.150)
10-yr lagged average of wet shock 0.177 0.220 0.167
(0.122) (0.130) (0.124)
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
Cultivating households only.
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Table 3: [WB] Summary Statistics
1956 1971 1986
Weighted log crop yield -0.285 -0.0204 0.190
(0.331) (0.342) (0.397)
Proportion of land irrigated 0.178 0.234 0.321
(0.175) (0.203) (0.256)
Average water need of crop portfolio 563.4 568.9 576.3
(51.58) (51.24) (49.55)
Proportion area planted to drought-tolerant crops 0.257 0.240 0.227
(0.265) (0.262) (0.263)
Proportion area planted to drought-sensitive crops 0.315 0.321 0.344
(0.318) (0.314) (0.309)
Current year rain 0.579 0.436 -0.400
(0.883) (1.007) (0.748)
10-yr lagged average rain 0.108 0.000608 -0.0353
(0.294) (0.288) (0.234)
10-yr lagged average of dry shock 0.176 0.203 0.191
(0.111) (0.122) (0.106)
10-yr lagged average of wet shock 0.224 0.185 0.163
(0.133) (0.106) (0.115)
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
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Table 4: Impact of Irrigation and Rainfall on Profits
Data set: REDS REDS WB
Specification: FE-IV FE-IV FE
Dependent variable: profit (fam. labor) profit log yield
(1) (2) (3)
Rain below 20th percentile 12.77 -42.34 -0.180∗∗∗
(139.8) (149.1) (0.0168)
Rain between 20th and 40th percentiles 71.57 67.21 -0.0474∗∗∗
(85.75) (93.56) (0.0112)
Rain between 60th and 80th percentiles 132.9∗ 71.06 0.00379
(76.91) (82.66) (0.00939)
Rain above 80th percentile 312.0∗∗∗ 332.8∗∗∗ -0.0188∗
(70.96) (74.40) (0.0104)
Proportion of land irrigated 372.1∗∗∗ 441.7∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(115.3) (129.8) (0.0687)
Propirr*Rain below 20th percentile -169.5 -84.43 0.265∗∗∗
(161.0) (174.7) (0.0403)
Propirr*Rain between 20th and 40th -200.8 -137.1 0.0929∗∗∗
(142.6) (153.2) (0.0292)
Propirr*Rain between 60th and 80th -126.9 -57.40 -0.000540
(123.5) (132.1) (0.0252)
Propirr*Rain above 80th percentile -416.8∗∗ -426.9∗∗ 0.0160
(174.0) (204.4) (0.0289)
Temperature 6.659 -10.16 -0.0215∗∗∗
(33.04) (39.48) (0.00416)
Nonland wealth (1971 Rs) / 106 2765.5∗∗ 1871.6
(1103.7) (1168.1)
Observations 6827 6827 8384
Standard errors in parentheses
Growing season rainfall. Village level clustering (REDS); district level clustering (WB).
Year fixed effects. Years 1982 and 1999 (REDS); years 1956-1986 (WB).
Proportion land irrigated instrumented with proportion inherited land irrigated (REDS only).
Non-land wealth instrumented with inherited non-land wealth (REDS only).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Impact of Irrigation Adaptation on Profits, 1971-1999
Under realized climate Under mean climate
Rainfall below 20th percentile 0.209 0.200
Rainfall between 20th and 40th percentiles 0.191 0.200
Rainfall between 40th and 60th percentiles 0.216 0.200
Rainfall between 60th and 80th percentiles 0.205 0.200
Rainfall above 80th percentile 0.178 0.200
Mean rainfall (z-score) -0.0256 0.000
Profits per acre, no adaptation (1971 Rs.) 613.8 620.2
Profits per acre, with adaptation (1971 Rs.) 614.7 -
Table 9: Projections for Adaptation for a Counterfactual Climate Change Scenario (Pre-
cipitation Change Only)
Outcome 1999
2039 projection,
no adaptation
2039 projection,
with adaptation
Change due to
adaptation
Prop. irrigated 0.483 0.645
0.528
(0.416, 0.640)
-0.117
(-0.229, -0.005)
Ave. water need 583.8 583.8 634.9(595.7, 674.0)
51.06
(11.94, 90.18)
Prop. tolerant 0.166 0.166
0.003
(0.000, 0.151)
-0.163
(-0.310, -0.015)
Prop. sensitive 0.476 0.476
0.623
(0.523, 0.722)
0.147
(0.047, 0.246)
95% confidence intervals in parenthesis
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